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Remarks of Matthew Warshaw at DC AAPOR 
October 17, 2007 
Q&A with Matthew Warshaw
Matthew Warshaw, Senior Research Manager of D3 Systems, spoke about doing survey 
research under adverse conditions at a seminar held by the DC chapter of the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) on Oct. 9, 2007. The following is a 
partial transcript of his presentation.  
Why do this in the first place? 
I think it’s very important to do this because these are populations that for the most part 
people don’t want to talk about. We want to prescribe what should happen in these 
places, not necessarily hear what people living in these situations have to say about their 
own situation. If you can get in and do polling, you add a kind of third voice to what’s 
being discussed. It adds another dimension to the debate, another part of the information 
picture that you wouldn’t see otherwise. It’s an important aspect of trying to find 
solutions to some of these problems. And despite the difficulties—no census data and 
other things—I think it’s worth trying to do this. 
Respecting Cultural Values 
In Afghanistan I have two separate field teams. I have a male field team and I have a 
female field team. Because I can’t have men interview women and I can’t have women 
interview men. So I have to have two completely separate field forces. Whereas I might 
get away with half the number of people I need in another environment, I have to double 
the size of my operation in Afghanistan.  
In different countries, people have different ideas about how work should be done, what 
an average work day should be, what’s appropriate for going out and doing interviewing 
and what kinds of questions are sensitive. You would think this would be political 
questions but sometimes just asking people’s age can be sensitive.  
In Port au Prince, we run into the problem that people don’t want to tell us their age 
because they’re afraid we’re going to use that information against them in a voodoo 
ritual. If you know someone’s age you can put a curse or a hex, you can do something to 
them. So people are nervous about giving out their age.  
In Afghanistan, we can’t ask male members of the household certain things about women 
under the age of 17. It’s considered extremely impolite to ask anything about some of the 
young women that live in the household. They’re supposed to live completely separately. 
So a male interviewer talking to a male member of the household is walking on difficult 
ground if he wants to speak to someone about what’s happening to the school age girls in 
the family, what kind of problems they may have, other issues like that.  
Logistical Challenges in Afghanistan 
The last semi-census in Afghanistan was in 1979. I would think things have changed 
tremendously, especially with five million people going to Pakistan and coming back, 
and wars. So you have to do your best estimates and then start to build your own data 
base. In Afghanistan, we’re over the 100,000 interview mark at this point and we’re 
collecting information about the number of people in each household. At some point, 
we’ll make our own weighting matrix and see what we can come up with.  
Afghanistan is not the largest country but it’s an incredibly diverse country from a 
geographic perspective. You’ve got deserts in some areas, high mountains. You can have 
snow blocking roadways and at the same time you can have cars overheating in another 
part of the country. It’s very difficult to get around the country and not a lot in the way of 
roads and other things. If you think about it as like a wheel with spokes: you often have 
to come back to the center to go somewhere else. You can’t go out to the end and then go 
to another spot that might only be ten kilometers away.  
Places like Afghanistan, these are all real paper and pencil operations. This is all about 
getting somebody who can get out into a neighborhood and find the appropriate person to 
talk to, hopefully get them away from the rest of the family, because you have large 
groups of people all living together. You may not be able to do a completely private 
interview. It generates a lot of attention. You come into a small village, they haven’t had 
visitors in a long time, everybody wants to know what’s happening.  
Women [interviewers] have a tremendously difficult time of just doing their jobs. They 
have to make sure they’re done at a certain hour of the day because they can have 
physical problems on the street. We’ve had a lot of interviewers attacked by people who 
don’t think it’s appropriate that they should be out working. They can run into problems 
at different houses that they come to. We find that certain hours of the day work better 
than others because the men tend to be out somewhere else and so it’s easier to get in and 
out. But completely separate field teams.  
Afghanistan is a mostly rural society. From our estimates, from what we can gather from 
previous census data, updates that are done by the central statistics office, some work 
done by the world food program and our own work, it’s about 77-78 percent rural. So it’s 
a logistics issue of getting out to all these rural places and then only about 20 or 22 
percent of the population is living in urban areas.  
We split the sample at the outset in Afghanistan between men and women. This is an 
unusual way to approach survey research but, because of the restrictions that we have, it’s 
really only the way to efficiently get work done. And so, right out of the gate, we have 
sampling points that are going to be all female sampling points and sampling points that 
are going to be all male sampling points. And we’ve spent a lot of time looking at the 
data doing different design effect calculations and what we’ve discovered is that it’s more 
about distance between locations than it is about gender or ethnicity in Afghanistan that 
create differences in the opinions.  
So what we have to be careful about is that we don’t end up clustering lots of female 
sampling points in one area and then there are no male sampling points or vice versa. But 
it’s a huge design effect problem for us and we’ve had to work around that but it’s really 
the only way to make sure we get both men and women into the sample.  
We select the households using random walk methodology. To get to that point, at this 
stage we think we have a fairly good idea of the number of people that are in each 
province in Afghanistan. We have a pretty good sense of the size of the different districts 
so we can proportionally distribute the number of interviews down to the district level.  
But beyond the district—who knows? There could be four thousand people in one 
village, three thousand in another. It’s very hard to tell. There isn’t enough information 
about those spots. So we end up having to treat them almost equal and we do it as a 
simple random distribution of villages that are given an assigned starting location off of 
maps and grids that we have and then they’re conducting a random walk in rural areas, 
it’s usually every third household. And we use Kish grids* to select [respondents]. As 
I’ve said we split the sample male/female, so female interviewers are making a listing of 
the female members of the household and then they’re selecting them according to the 
Kish grid. The males are making a listing of the male members of the household and then 
selecting the male according to the Kish grid.  
We’ve got a three call back policy. They can’t just take whoever happens to come to the 
door and be friendly enough to talk to them. We have to spend a lot of time sending 
people back to some of these villages to do the checks and to make sure it’s happening. It 
can be difficult, especially in some of these extremely rural spots. We go to places up in 
the mountains and spending the whole day just to get to some of these locations. And 
then it’s quite an expense to send a supervisor or someone back. But it’s a randomized 
process and so the interviewers know that they could be checked up on at any time and 
they won’t get paid if they find out that there’s cheating and other things. So we uncover 
it. We uncover problems all the time. That’s how you train the field force. That’s how 
you teach them you’re serious about what you do.  
And then we have to get everything back to one central location to key punch it in. Forget 
about scanners, forget about handheld PDAs that are sending it back and you’ve got 
instant data. We’ve actually got to have people sit down with paper questionnaires and 
punch this into computers and then we have to go back and validate a certain percentage 
of those so we do double entry to make sure that the key punchers are doing their job 
right. And then we’ve got to spend a lot of time going through and cleaning up all the 
mistakes that the key punchers have made. So it’s a very, very labor intensive process. 
Growing Violence in Iraq 
And then there’s Iraq, which is a very different situation. We have a much better 
workforce in Iraq. The infrastructure, although very, very badly damaged is much more 
manageable. When we came to Iraq, we found lots of people with PhDs, a lot of people 
who had studied sociology. There were people that were ready and willing to do this 
work. When we got to Afghanistan, we had a hard time finding people that could read 
and write. One of the first tests that we give interviewers in Afghanistan is they have to 
stand in front of us and read from the questionnaire. A lot of people just can’t do that. In 
Iraq, it’s a completely different situation: well-educated population, easier to set up the 
operation there.  
What’s changed in Iraq is that it is significantly more violent than Afghanistan and it’s 
become a much more difficult thing to work there. We started with a more centralized 
operation, the way that we work in Afghanistan, with everything centralized out of 
Kabul. That’s the way that we used to work in Iraq but then anytime something happened 
to the central part of the operation, the rest of it fell apart. So we now have almost 18 
separate offices, one for each province in Iraq so they can operate independently from 
each other. And month to month, one province will have a problem and another province 
will have to fill in for that team. So they have to be interchangeable. 
It’s set up where we’ve got an overall quantitative team director and a qualitative team 
director. The quant team has regional trainers that travel around doing training for the 
different groups. There are 19 field supervisors. There are 18 provinces; we have two 
main supervisors for Baghdad because it’s a large area. And we’ve got a pool of over 200 
interviewers at this point. And the qualitative team is growing.  
In Iraq, it’s the insurgency and the breakdown of law and order—that’s what makes 
doing the survey research difficult. Random sampling in places like Iraq and Afghanistan 
has an added dangerous component to it. You don’t know what you might find behind the 
door.  
In Afghanistan, recently, we had some people knock on a door and they happened to 
come across a house where there were Taliban members hiding out. They got held and 
we had to get people involved negotiating their release. In Iraq, we’ve had people stopped 
at checkpoints and held by different groups: criminal groups asking for money, political 
groups wanting different things.  
And in Iraq, especially, there are the ethnic divisions. It’s a serious problem. We have to 
have separate teams. We can’t send Sunnis from Anbar into Baghdad to interview Shias. 
We can’t send Shias from Basra to do work in Sunni areas. We can’t send Kurds 
anywhere other than Kurdish areas. Where we started out with a unified field force in 
Iraq, we now have all of these separate field forces that have to operate separately on a 
linguistic basis and an ethnic basis. 
Once again, Iraq doesn’t have a census. We’re using updates that were done before the 
elections to try to estimate the number of people so that when they did the elections they 
could distribute things evenly. And we’re using information from the world food program 
and the United Nations. But once again in Iraq with all of this movement internally, with 
people changing neighborhoods with ethnic strife, with the war, all the other things that 
are happening, it’s hard to know how stable those populations have been. So, once again, 
once we get down below a certain level, we’re doing a simple random sample. We’re 
doing the best area probability we can to try to cover the geography and then come back 
and see what we have and how closely it matches the other data that are out there.  
We use some things that are called “place codes.” There was a lot of satellite imaging 
that was done of Iraq in the 1990s for the United Nations to help with the distribution of 
aid. So you can pinpoint actual settlements and we had over 11,000 that were pinpointed 
on a map and over a couple years, we’ve been able to visit the vast majority of them and 
classify them: Are they urban or rural? Do they exist? Have they disappeared? Are there 
new ones? If so, we’ve added them in.  
 
* Kish grid: a mechanism for selecting a respondent from a household at random so that 
the entire sample reflects the makeup of the general population in terms of age, gender, 
family status, etc. 
 
